Just as long as you understand that the messages remain verifiably solidly-encrypted within Signal servers, both in-transit (network) and at-rest (storage).
As to about the end-devices that uses Signal-client, that is about as strong as you and your OS lets you.
I've encountered this argument ... repeatedly. Let's explore the DIY route:
If you can build your own Signal server, you too can serve you and your own circle of friends. The bar is not that high (Java and VPS).
Signal clients are even easier but it remains mostly an unique build-challenge due to not so strong documentation and by the virtue of mastery of multi-platforms.
Having said all that jazz, step back and ask yourself this, what am I losing by building my own Signal-protocol network?
Anonymity
Now, you would easily stick out like sore thumb to all the Internet overwatch, even within VPN tunnels.
That's a risk for me.
What am I actually gaining?
Not much: a more unique hash signature of client app (it has downsides); the ability to perform a unique but slight tweak of hash/key/encryption algorithm using same Signal protocol (dangerous rabbit hole), and avoidance of XDR/NDR/IPS/IDS firewall, and the biggest one: zero spreading of hashed contact info
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Alternatively, let's take the original route: your own client against "the" Signal server:
Now, Signal protocol would be open to misshapen protocal usages (think "fuzzing"). Might be a good thing but certainly not at this early stage; do we have the manpower to stand guard over a protocol like ISC Bind9 team do with their DNS?
The one area that is not firmed up 100% (more like 99.999%) yet is the Privacy Information Protection axiom and that is centered around the exhanges of hashed "Contact" address book. This there is largely understudied and under-whitepapered: how to exchange contact info in safe privacy order just to build your network: I keep that Signal client app option off for now and manually add my contacts.
That's very misguided of you to say and pure speculation. It's as useful for a discussion as me saying "Durov is Russian-born, and has resisted proper e2e encryption defaults, so the Kremlin incentivized him to do it, so they can spy on people". You see how this works?
There is actually a clear official statement from Signal why they don't permit open-source clients to use their servers.
What in their statement suggests that they are "hiding something"?
If you can find something wrong with their protocol, source, or suspect that somehow the communication is compromised when it reaches their servers, please go ahead and disclose it, but thinly veiled: "do they have something to hide" is just speculation.
> That blog post is 8 years old and predates things like mastodon
What in this blog post that's 8 years old has become obsolete in the meantime?
> Nothing has changed in these intervening 8 years?
Signal got better, and got bigger user base in a couple of waves, with most notably the WhatsApp terms of service fiasco. Is that what you meant?
Btw, people are still free to clone/fork the client, the protocol, and run their own servers. But compute ain't free, and you can read about that here: https://signal.org/blog/signal-is-expensive/
I think that for folks living in the West, Putin and his gang of cyber criminals is much bigger day to day threat than the NSA. So the fact that Durov is still alive (a couple days in a French prison is the least he has to worry about) makes Signal look like a much better bet than Telegram.
The mostly unelected EU regime really loves censorship. Nobody ever claimed that Putin is in any way better. That doesn't mean that the EU isn't complete shit. And if you want to focus on the EU market like Whittaker claims in the interview it only works if you are completely compromised. Also looking at her history I don't think you could find a more glow in the dark person than her.
Doesn't matter. As long as the code is open source and e2ee, Signal staff could be official NSA employees, it wouldn't matter (in the short term - in the long term, you would see these things to change, of course.)
I'd change my mind on Signal if you can demonstrate an attack that assumes an evil signal operator, or evil signal servers.
Signal know they just need to keep themselves open to the possibility of this kind of demonstration. Then any mistrust, combined with the fact that there is no exploit at the next CCC or defcon, becomes evidence that it's secure. More mistrust -> More attempts to prove its insecure + no demonstration of insecurity -> better argument that its secure. It's a negative feedback loop. It's also honest - you could actually break it. Did I miss how you can break it? Link to the demo.
Signal the program doesn't trust signal the organization, as it should be. That's the core idea. It's what lets them not get fucked by the government. They cooperate fully and ensure they have nothing to tell (privacy by design. data minimization. self blinding). And by having a lot of users they make themselves impossible to ban and thereby protect the whole concept.
Whittaker is very smart politically. The software isnt perfect, sure. It's polished and reliable and secure. Make a better one... it is fine.
Also, are you reading what she's saying? This is not what compromise looks like. Here is how compromise looks like: When you see them starting to talk about protecting people by establishing police control to fight the bogeyman. When they start talking about the threats here, threats there, enemies here, enemies there... When they say, because of big tech, we need things like DSA (enforcement regimes, access for police) [1]. Whittakter says because of big tech, we need a lot of open source projects backed by nonprofit organizations that dont advertise, dont surveill, and have no incentive to start doing it... and that build stuff that has no backdoors and makes no affordances for state or anyone else in power to compromise it.
[1] and then plugins like E-Evidence, and finally rules like in England that prohibit privacy by design... which would prohibit: Signal... but which the english are not enforcing because of protests by: Signal.
