So the government wants to develop communication links with hot zones. I find it more likely they want reliable communication with agents in conflict zones without needing agents to carry specialized equipment that could tip off local governments [0]. After all, if you install one of these Internet-in-a-suitcase devices in a conflict zone, you're likely there for more than a package delivery. What better way to blend in than mixing with hundreds of local citizens trying to use the same shadow network to communicate with the outside world? The risk still seems high, but it seems marginally better to be identified as a protester than a spy.
[0] Except for, of course, the Internet-in-a-suitcase itself.
Satphones draw attention in much of the world. It's hard to pretend to be an ordinary peasant when you're carrying a device that costs the equivalent of two year's wages. When the US and Afghan authorities are detaining people for possessing a digital watch[1], a satphone is a total liability.
WiFi-enabled smartphones are ubiquitous and dirt cheap - used shanzhai handsets cost just a few dollars. A smartphone's firmware is the ideal place to hide crypto.
[0] Except for, of course, the Internet-in-a-suitcase itself.